Looking beyond the DGCA and the CAA

In 2013, the civil aviation ministry (MoCA) proposed the setting up of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and a Bill was produced but not implemented during UPA II’s tenure.
In 2015, after the government changed, then-civil aviation minister Ashok Gajpatiraju dismissed the idea, arguing that he saw no reason for a change in nomenclature. As per the minister’s understanding, the new authority would merely replace DGCA, amounting to a change in name but not much else! He set the matter to rest by decisively saying he saw no reason to do so.
Over two decades of covering the government in India have convinced me that ministers are blessed with a unique ability to see only either what they are shown or what they choose to see, unable to see what even the common man can spot with ease.
This is one of those instances. Anyone who flies and frequents India’s airports can attest that more Indians are flying than ever before, and with the rise in passenger numbers, complaints and grievances have also surged. These are all voiced and go viral on social media. Pressure eventually mounts on the authorities — be it MoCA or the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) — to address these. These range from cancellations and delays, errant passenger or crew behaviour, and unjustified levies to more serious incidents or transgressions by the airline operators. As one senior industry professional recently quipped, the director general of “civil aviation” had turned into the director general for “consumer affairs”. In the absence of any proper redressal system, airlines in India are getting away with nothing short of murder, which I will elaborate on in many subsequent pieces.
The UPA II proposed that the new CAA would discharge all the duties currently assigned to DGCA, including safety oversight, environmental regulation, licensing, international coordination, advising the government, and industry development. It would also be responsible for the protection of consumer interests and training of civil aviation personnel, including its own staff. It further argued that appeals against CAA’s decisions may be made to the government, and all funds received by CAA, including central government grants, fees, and charges, would be credited to the Civil Aviation Authority Fund, giving it financial autonomy.
While the CAA, as envisaged by UPA II, was a good idea, it didn’t go far enough. Having watched and written about the functioning of the DGCA for over two decades, here are some of the things I think are non-negotiable for any safety regulator.
To start with, there is absolutely no justification for the safety regulator to be headed by an IAS cadre officer, or for that matter, any bureaucrat. In fact, one of the better DGCA chiefs was Air Marshal Jafar Zaheer who had warned Indira Gandhi against her younger son’s unauthorised flying and resigned when his warning was ignored. Had she heeded his advice, the history of this country and its leadership might have been quite different from what it is today.
The current system of an IAS officer (mostly, additional secretary level) heading the regulator doesn’t work for a host of reasons, the foremost being that he is beholden to the minister for his next promotion as secretary. Hence, he treads on eggshells and is apt to do everything the minister demands, several of which run antithetical to what should ideally be done. A ji-hazoor culture might work in other areas, but not flight safety.
Moreover, the top official at the safety regulator needs to have an in-depth knowledge of the aviation sector globally, given it is a technologically fast-moving sector. We don’t need only bureaucrats, many of whom spend their tenure struggling to grasp the technicalities of aviation and quick action gets ruled out in almost every situation. Further, it is equally critical that he is resistant to the pressures from airline operators to make the rules more amenable to their interests. In other words, his moral probity must be beyond reproach.
An interesting aside here: Unlike other regulators, such as the Federal Aviation Authority (United States) or European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the qualifications of India’s director general of civil aviation are omitted on the website. A former FAA chief, Steve Dickson, graduated from the US Air Force Academy, worked over 30 years with Delta, had flown both fighter and commercial jets during his career and had held the position of director of the Air Navigation Bureau of the International Civil Aviation Organization before he was chosen to head the regulator.
Last but not least, once countries find a highly qualified head, they don’t keep changing them at the drop of a hat. EASA, for instance, has maintained the same head for eight years in some cases while in India, the average tenure was less than two years up until very recently.
To make matters worse, the DGCA structure is quite complicated with one director general, six joint directors general, six deputy directors general, 17 directors and 43 deputy directors. Many appear to work at cross-purposes and yet are not held accountable when they fail to perform their duties adequately or if any discrepancy occurs.
While many airline industry insiders have always maintained that the DGCA is overly top-heavy, it is quite possible that, given the pace the country’s aviation market has grown, more officers are needed even at the senior levels. But there is no denying that fixing responsibilities clearly and holding individual officers accountable is urgently needed. When it comes to the selection of those who head specific functions, the focus needs to be on quality instead of quantity.
This is not to say we don’t need more hands-on board to keep the skies safe. But we can’t fill the regulatory body with whomever the powers-that-be desire or favour. The usual kith-and-kin approach does not work in a sector as technically advanced as this. Playing with human lives is not a sport anywhere in the world.
Financial freedom for the regulator is also a critical need. This is the only way to ensure that the regulator can attract the needed skilled talent at market rates and be free to hire and fire as per its requirements. This can be easily tackled by levying a small charge of ₹10 or ₹20 on every air ticket sold in the country. No passenger would object to a small levy to ensure that their safety is ensured.
Moreover, sufficient resources and autonomy are required for the regulator to keep pace with the rest of the world on safety matters. As things stand, once the allotted resources run out, DGCA officials often have to back out of International Air Transport Association (IATA) or ICAO meetings and other forums, in which regulators from other nations participate. This makes little sense for the world’s third-largest aviation market by aircraft size.
There needs to be an independent body to keep an eye on and rate the work of the watchdog and ensure corrective action is taken as needed. The regulator is there to ensure that airline operators do not cut corners, follow all the rules, and deliver a safe, reliable air service. What happens when there is a serious incident or accident, like a recent one in which two pilots lost their lives after a trainee aircraft crashed in Jamshedpur? Who is liable for these lost lives: the founders of the flying school or the DGCA officials who are in charge of ensuring the flying schools follow all safety protocols? Will the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) do a thorough examination, identify the causes, and ensure corrective measures are taken? It is possible that the DGCA was lacking in its duties or the flying school in observing the rules or both. The AAIB, too, needs to be an independent body as well, with no affiliation or link to MoCA. It should be free to pull up the DGCA when required like the National Transport Safety Board is in the US with respect to the FAA.
In the past, after every major air accident or incident in India, expert committees were set up to examine the reasons and recommend corrective action in long reports. These reports then gather dust and, at some stage, are consigned to the dustbin. Very few of the recommendations made over the years have actually been implemented, according to industry and even DGCA sources.
Just to cite one instance, in the early 2000s, India borrowed the concept of the accountable manager from EASA but did not follow it in letter or spirit. Post the 2010 crash in Mangalore, in which 158 lives were lost, the accountable manager of the airline was not held accountable, continued working in the airline, and was the chief operating officer (COO) of the airline when its next serious accident took place at Calicut in August 2020. Had this happened with any of the European carriers, the accountable manager would very likely have faced punitive action or, at the bare minimum, lost his position of significance in the carrier post the first crash itself as per EASA laws and regulations.
This illustrates just one of the several gaps in the functioning of the present DGCA. While the whole gamut of safety-related issues that need tackling remains outside the purview of this article, it is imperative for the government to abolish DGCA in its present form, set up a new financially independent safety regulator that focuses solely on this aspect, and further set up an ombudsman that focuses on passenger-related aspects, including grievances and woes.
Anjuli Bhargava writes on governance, infrastructure and the social sector. The views expressed are personal